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Abstract
A theory usually comprises assumptions and deduced predictions from them.
In this paper, empirical evidences corroborate with assumptions about time
for a decision making facing known probabilities and outcomes.
Keywords: Prospect Theory, nonextensive statistics, time average, contrast
ratio
1. Introduction
In behavioral finance, Kahneman and Tversky presented a descriptive
model of decision-making behavior facing probabilistic alternatives involving
losses or gains, where probabilities and outcomes are known [1, 2]. The
Prospect Theory proposed by them does not contain time as an assumption
that justifies the behavior of decision-makers.
In econophysics, Ole Peters and Gell-Mann have assumed that an indi-
vidual’s wealth grows over time according to a stochastic process in a gamble
repetition mode [3]. This assumption was later assumed as part of the ra-
tional sense, where individuals make decisions so that growth rate of their
wealth is maximized over time [4].
If we consider the growth rate over time as a physical stimulus for decision
making, then the contrast ratio between time averages can define a threshold
between the stimuli and the sensations (or perceptions) they produce. The
reason for this is that we avoid the cognitive effort of calculating rates that
evolve probabilities and outcomes. Thus, the fuzziness problem arises, which
consists in characterizing the contrast between the growth rates to establish
the fuzzy and crisp regions for decision making.
In order to solve this problem, simple gambles and sure outcomes, equiv-
alent on the ensemble average, were modeled similarly to the Kahneman and
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Tversky’s experiments [2]. Through temporal logic, gambles in the gain do-
main were compared using meiotic argumentation, and gambles in the loss
domain were compared by hyperbolic argumentation [5]. Thus, one can ob-
serve an S-shaped curve, which “coincidentally” is made up of the usual
functions of nonextensive statistical mechanics [6, 7] (being further evidence
of how nonergodicity can cause nonextensivity).
In a second version of the Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky high-
lighted that “the shape of the weighting functions favors risk seeking for small
probabilities of gains and risk aversion for small probabilities of loss, provided
the outcomes are not extreme”[8]. Therefore, there is another range of gains
and losses to be explored. Through the proposed model in this paper, it is
shown that better contrasts may be found when the outcomes are extreme.
In order to test the suggested model, an opinion poll was done to see if
people facing gambles are searching for the best time average. The prob-
lems are similar to those elaborated by Kahneman and Tversky, however,
extreme outcomes were used to verify the assumption of repetition, so that
the repetition of proposed gambles can lead an individual quickly to great
abundance (or ruin), shortening the time until the goal to be achieved (or
to be avoided). The obtained results revealed that the temporal impact on
the wealth is determining for the decision-making heuristic, showing that the
amounts have a wide range of physical stimuli which can present over one
heuristic for the same probabilities. Also, it is noted that the contrast ratio
between time averages may influence the uncertainty about the behaviors.
Thus, there is a need to establish a threshold between physical stimuli for a
deepening of psychophysical description.
2. Theoretical model
Consider that two gain options are presented to an individual, where only
one of them can be choose. In order to model these options, we have the
hypothesis Θ2 = “to win M” (M > 0) and a probability p ∈ [0, 1], so that:
l1 = to win Mp (at the next moment);
l2 = to win M (at the next moment) with probability p.
The expression “at the next moment” may not appear, but we must consider
it, even implicitly, to represent the low waiting time. Moreover, note that
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both options are equivalents in the ensemble average (expected value is pM
for the two options).
Now, let us consider an individual called Bob who may repeat similar
gambles in the future. If the gamble l2 is repeated several times until he wins
M , then Bob may affirm
FΘ2 = ‘‘I will sometime win M’’,
where each trial occurs at the next moment with time probability p.
If Bob’s repetition has success frequency p and he perform x = M/W0
on each occurrence, then, by the time average, W0 (1 + x)
p is the wealth
temporal expectation at the next moment (after the gamble). Note that
p = 1 means that the proposition θ2 is true, i.e., Bob will win M . In contrast,
p = 0 means that the statement FΘ2 is fanciful because the proposition Θ2
is false. However, when 0 < p < 1, the proposition Θ2 is in the status of
future contingency, it is neither true nor false.
2.1. Meiosis for gains
A rhetoric procedure possible for inquiring the future contingency is the
meiosis, where we can elaborate a figure of thought reducing the reward
to obtain an affirmative with the maximum sense of certainty. This rhetoric
procedure is useful to evaluate risk aversion for gains described by Kahneman
and Tversky [2], where we design a figure of thought assuming which people
underestimate risky options and choose gains with certainty (both equivalent
on the ensemble average).
If the wealth temporal expectation after the gamble l2 is W0 (1 + x)
p,
then underestimated reward by the time average is W0 (1 + x)
p−W0. Thus,
the similar future tense which have equivalent outcome to FΘ2 over time is
Nθ2(p) = ‘‘I will win W0
(
1 +
M
W0
)p
−W0 at the next moment’’,
where this tense future is elaborated as from modest hypothesis
θ2(p) = ‘‘to win W0
(
1 +
M
W0
)p
−W0’’.
The statement Nθ2(p) argues certainty about l2 according to the proba-
bility p. For example, Nθ2(0) means that Bob thinks “I will win nothing at
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the next moment” because the probability is null. This strategy in rhetoric
is useful because the distinction between Nθ2(p) and Nl1 depends only on
the values of the awards. Thus, taking x ≥ 0, such that x = M/W0, Bob can
evaluate two options selecting the higher changing, i.e.,
Nl1 or Nθ2 = max{px, (1 + x)p − 1} (1)
= px for all x ≥ 0. (2)
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Figure 1: Function M+p (x) to represent meiosis. The blue dashed line x/2 is tangent to
the ◦-blue curve given by M+1/2(x). Analogously, the red dashed line x/10 is tangent to
the ∗-red curve given byM+1/10(x). Note that in the vicinity of zero the curves are close,
so this is a region of low distinguishability for the changes.
When we evaluate the expected change at the next moment versus hypo-
thetical change, the line px is tangent to the concave curve (1+x)p−1 at the
point x = 0, what results in px ≥ (1 + x)p − 1 for all x ≥ 0. We can see an
example in Figure 1, where the dashed blue line x/2 is above the curve ◦-blue
(1 + x)
1
2 − 1. Analogously, a similar illustration can be seen for p = 1/10.
We can note that the option l1 is rationally preferable for any values of M
and p, because the line px is always above the curve (1 + x)p − 1. Thus, the
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concave curve representing the expected positive change at the next moment
can be described by
M+p (x) = (1 + x)p − 1
= p lnp(1 + x) for all x ≥ 0. (3)
The function lnp(x) ≡ (xp− 1)/p is defined here as in [9] and it is commonly
used in nonextensive statistical mechanics [7, 6].
2.2. Hyperbole for losses
If we replace the word “win” for “lose” in the options l1 and l2, then we
have the following options that result in the wealth decreasing:
l3 = to lose Mp (at the next moment);
l4 = to lose M (at the next moment) with probability p.
Now consider the hypothesis Θ4 = “to lose M” for an individual named
Bob. If l4 is repeated until Bob loses M , then this gamble becomes similar
to
FΘ4 = ‘‘I will sometime lose M’’,
where the time probability p is implicit for each repetition.
The second rhetoric procedure for inquiring the future contingency is the
hyperbole, where we may elaborate a figure of thought increasing the loss
to obtain an affirmative with the lower sense of certainty. For instance, the
option l3 proposes the certainty of loss at the next moment. In order to
compare l3 and FΘ4, the hyperbolic rhetoric may reduce the sense of cer-
tainty from l3 overestimating the loss. For this, let us consider the following
hyperbole
L3 = ‘‘to lose W0 −W0
(
1− pM
W0
) 1
p
’’.
The statement L3 has an exaggeration of loss Mp, but uncertain for each
attempt over time. Thus, due to repetition, Bob may affirm in the future
FL3 = ‘‘I will sometime lose W0 −W0
(
1− pM
W0
) 1
p
’’
to argument a change (1 + px)
1
p − 1 for x = −M/W0 and −1 ≤ x < 0, where
the exaggerated event occurs at the next moment with time probability p. So,
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by the time average, l3 and FL3 are equivalent because the wealth temporal
expectations are
W0
{
1− 1
W0
[
W0 −W0
(
1− pM
W0
) 1
p
]}p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
time average of FL3
= W0
(
1− pM
W0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
time average of l3
. (4)
When we evaluate the expected change in the future versus hypothetical
change, the line x is tangent to the convex curve (1 + px)
1
p − 1 at the point
x = 0 for any p, what results in (1 + x)
1
p − 1 ≥ x for −1 ≤ x < 0. In
Figure 2 the dashed black line x represents the expected change of FΘ4 in
the future and the curves ∗-red and ◦-blue, belonging to the family of curves
exp − 1 (exp ≡ (1 + px)
1
p as in [9]), represent the hyperbolic argumentation
for l3, expected change of FL3 in the future. Therefore, the option l3 is
preferable, but we can note that curves are barely distinguishable from the
line for hypothetical changes between -0.2 and 0.
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Figure 2: The hyperbolic curves (1+px)
1
p for p = 1/2 and p = 1/10. Note that the curves
tangentiate the black dashed line x at the point zero. The interval −0.2 ≤ x < 0 is a
region of low distinguishability.
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The hyperbole as figure of thought is useful to evaluate risk seeking be-
tween losses alternatives described by Kahneman and Tversky [2], where we
can assume that people overestimate losses with certainty to choose losses
with risk (both equivalent on the ensemble average). However, there is a
region of fuzziness for non-extreme losses which may cover up to 20% of an
individual’s equity.
3. The fuzziness problem and the S-curve
When we try to understand two simultaneous discourses, speakers with
almost the same voice intensity will not be easily understood. Analogously,
in logical devices, the contrast between two signals is essential for a interpre-
tation of information. Thus, the fuzziness problem consists in quantifying
whether or not two signals have almost the same intensity.
The fuzziness problem arise in financial signals because decision makers
may avoid to calculate changes using equity values, rewards (or losses), and
probabilities. In order to find gambles into region of fuzziness, we can use
a factor to measure the similarity between signals. A factor commonly used
is the contrast ratio [10, 11]. Considering the time averages as signals of
physical stimulus, then the contrast ratio in dB may be expressed by the
following equation
CRdB =

10 log10
(
xp
p lnp(1+x)
)
if x ≥ 0,
10 log10
(
exp−1
x
)
if − 1 < x < 0.
The value xp/plnp(1 + x) is the ratio between the options signals of l1 and
l2 (See equation 1). Analogously, (e
x
p − 1)/x is the ratio between the signals
of l3 and l4.
Figure 3 shows the contrast ratio CRdB for hypothetical changes between
-1 and 2. We can note that losses are harder to distinguish than gains. If we
consider a region of fuzziness between -0.5dB and 0.5dB, then certain and
risk loss, between 0 and -20%, can be fuzzy for judgment. On the other hand,
according to time average, options for gains, without very high probabilities,
have high contrast ratio for any gain greater 10% (see the ◦-blue and dashed-
red curves for x > 0, where p = 0.5 and p = 0.05, respectively).
If we evaluate through the basic principle of the isolation effect [12], the
fuzziness in the field of small losses may lead us to seek another physical
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Figure 3: Contrast ratio between time averages in dB versus hypothetical change x. The
yellow zone is a hypothetical region of fuzziness between -0.5dB and 0.5dB.
incentive to make the judgment. A parameter easily distinguishable in op-
tions l3 and l4 are the known time probabilities. Therefore, when we are
faced the fuzziness, we can simplify theses options by “small decreasing in
wealth with certainty” and “small decreasing in wealth with probability p”.
The small decreases in wealth are almost the same and undesirable, but the
uncertainty argues hope for escaping losses and it is desirable. Thus, the
uncertain loss will be more attractive in this situation, where fuzziness pre-
vents us from making a better judgment. Then, in order to simulate risk
seeking in the small losses region, we must insert a rate ρ into the hyperbolic
argumentation process, so that
H−p (ρx) ≡ (1 + pρx)
1
p − 1
= eρxp − 1.
The rate ρ makes the curve H−p (ρx) more convex. Thus, its first values
pass below the line x to simulate the risk seeking. In Figure 4 the red curve
has ρ = 1.05 and p = 1/2 to simulate this effect in the interval −0.2 < x < 0.
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Now we can make a judgment between the sentences FL3 and FΘ4. Both
are identical with respect to time, the difference between them is only the
decrease in wealth,
FL3 or FΘ4 = max{eρxp − 1, x} (5)
=
{
x for small losses,
eρxp − 1 for big losses.
This means that the gamble l4 is preferable when M represents small losses,
but when the losses are large, then l3 is interpreted as the best option. Thus,
the risk seeking may disappear when the signals are distinguishable.
In order to understand in practice how the risk seeking disappears when
losses are extreme, imagine all the necessary goods for your survival. After
imagining them, then what do you prefer? “to lose 50% of all your goods”
or “to lose all your goods with probability 0.5”? Note that both options
have the same ensemble average, but if you choose the first option, then you
understood that a ruin aversion can be dominant for high losses [13]. See
the experimental result of problem 1 in the next section, where an analogous
situation is presented to respondents.
Finally, the function with expected changes at the next moment, convex
for losses and concave for gains, exhibiting a S-shape, can be defined by
Sp(x) =
{
p lnp(1 + x) if 0 ≤ x,
eρxp − 1 if − 1 ≤ x < 0.
In Figure 4, when p = 1/2 and ρ = 1.05, the function Sp(x) has risk seeking
for −0.2 < x < 0, but has a kind of ruin aversion for −1 ≤ x < −0.2. The
risk aversion is always present for all x ≥ 0 when p = 1/2.
4. Experimental results and discussion
Questionnaires were prepared to see if people facing gambles seek the one
with the best time average. The problems have equivalent options on the
ensemble averages (similar to those presented by Kahneman and Tversky
[2]), but extreme outcomes were used to verify the assumption of repetition.
Thus, the repetition of proposed gambles can lead an individual quickly to
great abundance (or ruin), shortening the time until the goal to be achieved
(or to be avoided). All respondents are psychology students from the Uni-
versidade Federal do Ceara´, Campus Sobral, so it is assumed that they do
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Figure 4: Function S0.5(x) for ρ = 1.05. When the red curve is below the dashed black
line we have risk seeking (interval −0.2 < x < 0). On the other hand, we have a kind of
ruin aversion when the red line is above the line x (interval −1 < x < −0.2). The risk
aversion behavior is always present for all x > 0 (dashed black line x/2 above the red
curve).
not have any training about time average. A total of 67 students answered
the questionnaire and the percentage of choice in each option is in brackets.
Problem 12 presented in [2] consists of choosing between an uncertain
loss with maximum entropy and a certain loss. In this case, Kahneman and
Tversky found that most individuals prefer a risky loss rather than a certain
loss. However, if we increase the losses magnitudes, then risk seeking can be
abandoned. The problem below shows how people present a risk aversion in
situations of losses that can lead an individual to ruin.
Problem 1 – Imagine all the material possessions you own: car, home,
bike, clothes, money, etc. If you have a big debt and they are offering the
following payment options, then which do you prefer?
a) Toss a coin. If it comes up heads, you loss all your goods, and if it
comes up tails, you loss nothing; [1.49%]
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b) to lose half of all you own. [98.51%]
A total of 66 individuals out of 67 preferred to lose half of all their goods,
rather than risking losing everything after the coin toss. Some respondents
expressed arguments such as “it is easier to continue with half than to start
over”. This type of argument shows that individuals see gambles as dynamic
processes and have the time as a determining factor in their choices. This
result is consistent with the high contrast ratio due to maximum magnitude
of losses. Figure 3 shows CRdB curve out of the region of fuzziness for p = 0.5
and hypothetical change x = −1. In addition, Figure 4 shows ruin aversion
(S-curve above the dashed line representing the risky option) when the loss
is maximum.
In the Prospect Theory, one of the quadruple patterns shows that most
individuals prefer small chances of receiving a premium than equivalent
amounts on the ensemble average. In everyday life, this phenomenon is
similar to buying some option contracts on the market (or raffle tickets [14,
Chapter. 29]) for $ 10 in order to stay exposed to a tiny chance to win $
200. However, according to Kahneman and Tversky, this behavior is not
maintained with extreme gains [8]. An analogous problem with very high
rewards can be seen below:
Problem 2 – Imagine that two opportunities are offered to you to become
a millionaire person and you can only choose one. So, which do you prefer?
a) to win 200 million dollars with probability 0.05; [4.48%]
b) to win 10 million dollars with certainty. [95.52%]
Only 4 individuals out of 67 expressed interest in taking risks. So, what’s the
difference between 1) rejecting $ 10 to stay exposed to winning $ 200 with 5%
chance, and 2) rejecting $ 10 million to stay exposed to winning $ 200 million
with the same chance? When we increase the rewards to the extreme, then
their impact on the individual’s wealth changes. Arguing about time, $ 10
million is an amount that takes a long time to acquire by most individuals,
and an opportunity to acquire it quickly is hard to miss. Therefore, the risk
aversion manifested by respondents facing high amounts is consistent with
the best time average.
Another behavior of the quadruple pattern is risk seeking even when the
probability of loss is high. An analogous problem with very high losses can
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be seen below:
Problem 3 - Imagine you received an inheritance equivalent to $ 200 mil-
lion. However, a problem has arisen upon receipt of inheritance and you will
have to choose between:
a) 95% chance to lose the $ 200 million; [26.87%]
b) to pay $ 190 million. [73.13%]
In Kahnemam and Tversky’s experiments without extreme outcomes, risk
seeking is preferable even when the probability of loss is very high [8], but
in the above problem, this phenomenon is not observed. First, respondents
do not seem to ignore inheritance. Second, they demonstrated risk aversion,
because most sought the certain loss that still guarantees a fortune of $
10 million (a hard amount to achieve over time). So, one of the quadruple
pattern, which suggests risk seeking even when the probability of loss is high,
can be violated when there are extreme losses.
The contrast ratio between time averages may influence decision-making
heuristics. For example, problems 1 and 2 have a high contrast ratio and we
note that the fraction of respondents who prefer option b is very high. If
these fractions are not far from that expected by the law of large numbers,
from Shannon’s entropy,
H(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p),
we have an almost certainty about the preference for the best time average
because entropy is low (H(0.9851) = 0.1118 for Problem 1 and H(0.9552) =
0.2639 for Problem 2). Therefore, this an evidence that high contrast between
time averages may lead to almost certainty about the behavior.
In problem 3, although the loss magnitude is very high, the contrast ratio
between time averages is low because of low probability. (see the ∗-magenta
curve in Figure 3). In addition, the entropy about behavior in this problem
is over three times the entropy of problems 1 and 2 (H(0.7313) = 0.8396). Is
this increase in uncertainty a consequence of the low contrast ratio between
time averages? Therefore, the contrast ratio between time averages may set a
threshold between the physical stimulus and the sensations and perceptions
they produce.
The temporal impact on the wealth is relevant for decision-making heuris-
tics. In all the above experiments, the risk seeking observed in the Prospect
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Theory experiments disappears with increasing outcome magnitude. This re-
sult shows that the amounts produce a wide range of physical stimuli which
may present over one heuristic for the same probabilities.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides strong evidence that decision-makers assume indefi-
nite repetitions when probabilistic alternatives involving losses and gains are
at stake. Therefore, time may be related to the physical stimuli, where high
outcomes and high contrast between time averages may lead decision-makers
to choose the best rate for wealth growth over time.
Assuming nonergodic dynamics, the S-shaped curve is rationally com-
posed of functions that can generate nonextensive properties. These func-
tions can help us predict the fuzzy and crisp regions to characterize the
perceptions and sensations produced. Therefore, a generalized S-curve may
be investigated to describe heuristics for the full range of losses and gains.
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